Why might populations support leaders who implement strict law and order policies at the expense of human rights?

________________________________________________________________________

Defined as a parasitic relationship, the world has created a dynamic in which the implementation of laws and the exertion of human rights have come at the expense of each other. This enforces an environment in which one can’t be achieved without sacrificing the other. Often populations may support leaders that incorporate this switch and tilting of the balance when such measures are a necessary response to threats. Consequently, these harsh policies become the only viable solution to restore control. French historian Foucault once said that “sites of struggle reveal power’s techniques.”  El Salvador, a nation entrenched by the constant abuse of power, has flipped an immediate switch that has transformed within months from a country infiltrated by gangs to a country infiltrated by authorities under Bukele’s “magic formula” regime. In 2024, Bukele garnered nearly three million votes, marking eighty-five per cent of the country’s whole population. Therefore, it is important to analyse how perceived insecurity, a populist narrative, and a desire for stability, may contribute to this perceived support in prioritising security over human rights. Yet the erosion of fundamental rights and the ineffectiveness of addressing the root cause explains why populations should not support leaders who implement strict laws at the expense of human rights. 

Oppressors are able to rise to power in periods of widespread insecurity and societal weakness, with conditions that create fertile ground and power vacuums for abuses of control. This exploitation is particularly seen against the emergence of violent gangs in El Salvador. In 1989 the United States began to deport young men to El Salvador who were involved in gangs, and in 1992 the Salvadoran Civil War ended. This paired with the poor economic and political state of El Salvador would cause a mixture of “two very dangerous ingredients”, that would make it the country with the highest homicide rate in 2009. Gangs such as MS-13 and Barrio-18 would engage in various criminal acts, drug trafficking, and sex trafficking, and impose fear in neighbourhoods for the youth to join gangs in order to keep their family safe. Therefore, rather than running on democracy and security, for nearly thirty years El Salvador ran on survival and violence. 

When relating this to the Global Political Challenge of security, it becomes evident that gangs act as non-state actors diminishing security, and the activity of military power was limited due to the interference of gangs, hence making attaining populace security a political concern. This made Bukele’s policies of mass-imprisonment and authoritative control attractive and a beacon of hope to a population who had been subjected to fear and constant dangers. Furthermore, the pervasive insecurity of El Salvador prior to Bukele’s presidency made the trading of human rights seem like a necessary and worthwhile exchange for many Salvadorans, with one voter stating that “now we have this president, who is governing the way God intends”.  

Bukele’s rise to power was facilitated by decades of gang violence, and governmental corruption, which left Salvadorans desperate for change. With a narrative to dissolve crime completely, his policies of aggressive gang crackdown resonated with a population exhausted by years of insecurity. Bukele became hailed as a saviour, dubbed “the world’s coolest dictator”, but more importantly analysed as an opportunist. Using the sentiments of the public who had a strong desire for stability, Bukele built a careful persona and strategy. By capitalising on how his policies on gang crackdown were the one solution to restore safety, Bukele was successfully able to erode civil liberties in the name of justice through legality. The president also heavily relied on a policy of “othering”, which had been essential in justifying his laws. By building the rhetoric that gangs were an existential threat to society, even labelling them as “terrorists” on social media, Bukele framed them as enemies of the state. Additionally, the statistics of being able to minimise crime by nearly a hundred per cent, within one presidency, creates a feeling of dependency on Bukele from the public, as the sole individual who has been able to solve this very complex problem. Despite the issues of mass wrongful conviction, and increased authoritative presence, the public views Bukele’s governance as what they define as being secure, with one mother being fine with the wrongful imprisonment of her son if it means being able to go outside safely. Whether it has addressed the GPC of security however, specifically in terms of his authoritarian measures shows that it has not been adequately met, especially when considering his implementations of strict laws in exchange for human rights. 

In transformative cases like El Salvador, where aggressive policies have been adopted, it is important to ask whether the prisons are overpopulated, or if the public is over-imprisoned, and does there come a point when attaining security becomes taking control? Through the erosion of fundamental rights and what Amnesty’s Americas director has nicknamed a “false illusion” and seemingly “magic formula”, it becomes evident that Bukele’s approach is only superficially promising but fundamentally flawed in being ineffective in addressing the root cause of the problem. Gang violence comes as a result of instability and many factors such as health, poverty, and low education, therefore mass arrest merely scratches the surface of the issue, and high rates of wrongful conviction only further contribute to the concern for security. Moreover, even though Bukele’s election was initially fueled by the fear instilled by gangs, his presidency now thrives on perpetuating fear within the public. 

This may point to how Bukele’s support is not built on support, but rather fear through his authoritative control, as anyone who opposes his policies, must consequently be the groups he targets: gang members. One citizen who is against Bukele having a second term said, “In a democracy, I’m not sure about all these things the president’s being doing in his first term.” Therefore, though Bukele’s policies didn’t hint at the removal of human rights, for his policies to be truly achieved, the withdrawal of these rights automatically becomes part of the process and affects all levels of society. 

Ultimately, Bukele’s governance does not eliminate fear, it simply redirects it. Salvadorans, once terrorised by gangs, now live under the unchecked power of a leader who dictates security on his terms. Through a history of violence, a desperate desire for stability in the face of fear, and a populist narrative, Salvadorans prioritise immediate protection over abstract ideals of justice and freedom, despite the erosion of certain fundamental rights and an inability to address the root cause of gang violence in El Salvador. True stability requires addressing the underlying causes of violence, not just silencing those who are labelled as threats.

________________________________________________________________________